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Preface 
 
I wrote the first draft of this paper in the middle of 2012. I was in Berlin for a conference about peace economics 
where I presented a paper on lone wolf terrorists who engage in shooting sprees or other ‘time concentrated’ 
acts of violence1. This was a follow up to my ‘Lone Wolf Terrorism’2 written a year or two before. In between, I 
had written, along with a co-author, another article that introduced the idea of ‘investigative economics’ or the 
provision of behavioural investigative advice based on the application of economic theory and frameworks3. The 
Phillips & Pohl (2012) article looked specifically at lone wolf terrorists and demonstrated how inferences could 
be drawn about these individuals on the basis of evidence left at their crime scenes and other characteristics of 
their activity. In particular, we were interested in showing that once the different attack methods available to 
terrorists are delineated in terms of their risks and rewards, the choice of attack method must allow us to infer 
something about the type of person who chose it, especially their risk preference. In turn, an inference regarding 
risk preference may generate additional inferences about the unknown offender, including the likely frequency 
of their attacks. We worked through all of this in the context of lone wolf terrorism.  
 
By the middle of 2012, more and more ideas about an investigative economics had fallen into place but most of 
the work had been written with reference to terrorism and terrorist behaviour. Also, the work was quite technical 
due to the nature of the economic theory that was being applied. In writing the first draft of this article, I wanted 
to touch on a broader application to other types of criminal behaviour and do so in a relatively non-technical 
way. My other motivation was the classic publish or perish force that compels researchers to get things done or 
risk missing the boat. It was clear to me from the questions and comments I received during my presentation at 
the conference that people were both very interested in these ideas and, if left to their own devices, would 
probably start to write about them. I knew, for example, that it was a small step from drawing conclusions about 
lone wolf terrorists who go on shooting sprees to drawing conclusions about so-called ‘school shooters’. I 
needed to take ownership of these ideas before others seized the opportunity. I called the first version of this 
paper ‘CSI: Economics’ and made it available on the SSRN platform.  
 
Between then and now, I have worked fairly constantly on developing this research program. For the most part, 
the work has been concentrated on terrorism and terrorist behaviour because that is where we started and that is 
where some of the more substantial law enforcement challenges have been. It is difficult, now, to summarise the 
order in which the ideas were formulated because many came all at once and required a lot of effort to work out 
in detail and many ideas emerged in collaboration with Gabriela Pohl, who is co-author on several important 
papers. In the later part of 2012, I think, we set to work on expanding our theoretical frameworks by using and 
adapting behavioural economics, especially prospect theory, to the problems that we were interested in. This 
resulted in two papers, published in 20144 and 20155, that explored terrorist choice from a behavioural 
                                                 
1 Phillips, P.J. 2012. The Lone Wolf Terrorist: Sprees of Violence. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 18, 1-11. 
https://eprints.usq.edu.au/22700/  
2 Phillips, P.J. 2011. Lone Wolf Terrorism. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 17, 1-29. https://eprints.usq.edu.au/18630/  
3 Phillips, P.J. & Pohl, G. 2012. Economic Profiling of the Lone Wolf Terrorist: Can Economics Provide Behavioural Investigative Advice? 
Journal of Applied Security Research, 7, 151-177. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2012.656250 
4 Phillips, P.J. & Pohl, G. 2014. Prospect Theory and Terrorist Choice. Journal of Applied Economics, 17, 139-160. 
https://eprints.usq.edu.au/25305/  
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economics perspective. We were able to show how reference points might shape attack method choice and 
identify those points that might trigger a higher risk strategy on the part of the terrorist or terrorist group. 
Alongside this work, I worked through the full structure of an investigative economics based on mean-variance 
analysis, a method that I had first applied to the analysis of terrorist choice in 20096. The result was my first 
book7 which, among other things, tested my ability to write a much longer analytical piece. I had thought the 
book was ready by late 2012 but it required substantial work throughout the first six months of 2013 before it 
was finally finished. During this time I had numerous other duties within my department and the book was 
completed away from the office, in a blur of afterhours and weekend work. Although the publisher is somewhat 
boutique, I think that the effort stands up in terms of accuracy of insight and analytical rigour.  
 
Naturally, once one idea opens up, further ideas follow and there is much detail to fill in. Within the 
investigative psychology literature, there is a stream of study looking into the idea of ‘geographic profiling’. The 
general idea is to determine where the unknown offender may live based on the nature and patterns of his or her 
illegitimate activity. We had already had something to say about the location (near or far) of the terrorist 
offender and how inferences could be drawn about this from the riskiness of his attack method choices (Phillips 
& Pohl 2012). Using prospect theory and interpreting the reference point as a geographical reference point, I 
sketched the broad outlines of a theory of geographic profiling based on the theoretical structure of Kahneman 
and Tversky’s prospect theory. This was presented at a conference on the economic analysis of terrorism at 
Stony Brook University in 20148. Later that year and throughout much of 2015, I worked on my second book 
which includes both this treatment and a more formal one9. This book is certainly focussed on the application of 
economic analysis to the terrorism context in ways that are operationally relevant for law enforcement but, in 
addition, it incorporates more general analysis of terrorist behaviour with a particular focus on brutality as the 
defining characteristic of terrorism.  
 
So, with work on this research program ongoing, I have returned to the draft of this paper in order to refresh it 
and update it by either including new explanations or by pointing out those of our works that have been 
published since 2012 and in which more detail can be found. The title is now ‘CSI: Investigative Economics’ 
with a sub-title ‘Drawing Inferences about Unknown Offenders’. Generally, our work is focussed on terrorism 
but the analytical frameworks apply just as well to other types of illegitimate activity. Terrorism studies has 
taken a ‘criminological turn’ and the field is in a state of transition. Our work recognises the importance of law 
enforcement experience in getting the most out of any analytical framework. Our analytical framework is 
multifaceted and incorporates a number of different perspectives emerging from decision theory and decision-
making under risk and uncertainty. The ‘results’ of our research will be found, we hope, in the ideas, new 
perspectives, insights and intuitions that our analytical framework generates when law enforcement practitioners 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 Phillips, P.J. & Pohl, G. 2015. Terrorist Choice: A Stochastic Dominance and Prospect Theory Analysis. Defence and Peace Economics, In 
Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2015.1033888  
6 Phillips, P.J. 2009. Applying Modern Portfolio Theory to the Analysis of Terrorism: The Set of Attack Method Combinations from which 
the Rational Terrorist Group will Choose in order to Maximise Injuries and Fatalities. Defence and Peace Economics, 20, 193-213. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242690801923124 
7 Phillips, P.J. 2013. In Pursuit of the Lone Wolf Terrorist: Investigative Economics and New Horizons for the Economic Analysis of 
Terrorism. Nova Publishers, New York, New York.  
8 Phillips, P.J. 2014. Geographic Profiling of Lone Wolf Terrorists: The Application of Economics, Game Theory and Prospect Theory. In: 
Workshop on Strategic Aspects of Terrorism, Security, and Espionage, 16-19 Jul 2014, State University of New York, Stony Brook, New 
York, USA. http://eprints.usq.edu.au/id/eprint/25573 
9 Phillips, P.J. 2016. The Economics of Terrorism. Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon, UK. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315637204   
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think about a problem, an unknown offender, a terrorist group or illegitimate behaviour with some or all of our 
framework in mind. In each case, this insight may be small or it may be significant but if it is sufficient to keep 
an investigative process moving it will have provided a useful complement to the existing approaches and 
processes of law enforcement.  
 
I. Introduction 
 
The criminal profiler character has been a main-stay on television for more than twenty years. An advantage of 
having a character who can get inside the mind of the criminal is that the otherwise scant evidence can be pieced 
together and the unknown offender caught all within a primetime hour. The profiler’s special gifts figure 
prominently in these stories. He or she possesses a more or less unique insight into the mind of the criminal. 
Using the available evidence at the crime scene the profiler draws inferences about the criminal that no-one else 
could draw. These could include where the criminal lives, the type of car he drives and where he will next 
commit a crime. The profiler can say, “He drives a dark coloured van. It’s all beat up. Only one headlight works. 
He works a menial job, maybe a janitor. He drives aimlessly through the streets at night. He cannot rely on his 
charm or talk. He must surprise his victims.” And as the profiler speaks, the scene cuts to a dark street and a van 
with one headlight… Whatever one might think of the television shows in which the profiler is portrayed, one 
must admit that the profiler makes for an intriguing character. 
 
Behind all of the make-believe, there lies the practice of offender profiling and the academic field of 
investigative psychology. These are inextricably linked but they are far from being the same thing even though 
offender profilers write articles about their work and investigative psychologists participate in real 
investigations. The most notable representatives of these two groups are John Douglas who played a leading role 
in the establishment of the FBI’s criminal profiling unit and who is the author of articles such as “Criminal 
Profiling from Crime Scene Analysis10,” published in Behavioural Sciences and the Law and of books written 
for a more popular audience such as Mind Hunter (Douglas & Olshaker 1996). David Canter is perhaps the 
leading representative of the academic field of investigative psychology. He is the author of many scholarly 
articles which detail studies into core of the profiling process: the drawing of inferences about the offender from 
evidence left at the crime scene. He is also the co-author of the first authoritative textbook on the subject11. 
 
The point of disagreement, if it may be described as such, between the two camps turns on the matter of the 
ability of the profiler to get inside the criminal mind. Criminal profiling is about drawing inferences about the 
criminal from the evidence that is left at the crime-scene. If one reads Douglas’s books and articles, it seems to 
be the case that the profiler has a special, instinctive ability to perform this task. It may be built on or 
complemented by years of law enforcement experience and training and education in psychology but a large 
part of it is instinctive. That this cannot be accepted fully by the academic side is clear. If profiling is more or 
less a skill that relies on individual abilities then investigative psychology, as an academic or scientific field of 
inquiry, is at least partially undermined. That the construction of a valid and useful criminal profile relies not on 
                                                 
10 Douglas, Ressler, Burgess & Hartman (1986). 
11 Canter & Youngs (2009).  
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the instinctive ability of the profiler as such but on the detached ‘laws’ of inference obtained by careful 
academic study of crimes and offenders and which can be applied by any appropriately trained person must be 
the more desirable state of affairs for the academic side of the profiling community. The problem is that there is 
still so much doubt about the validity of criminal profiling that it is unclear who will ultimately be proved 
correct on this particular point.  
 
Within some parts of the literature serious doubt has been cast upon the very possibility of offender profiling. 
According to some authors there are no patterns between crimes, crime scenes and offenders that are consistent 
enough to form the basis for any rigorous academic or rigorous practical offender profiling process. In short, the 
idea of profiling is better left in the television script than applied in real investigations. This point of view has 
found its strongest expression in the articles of Brent Snook and his colleagues who portray criminal profiling as 
fantastical. In an article entitled “The Criminal Profiling Illusion: What’s Behind the Smoke and Mirrors?” 
Snook et al. (2008) argue there is an absence of ‘compelling’ scientific evidence that offender profiling is 
reliable, valid or useful and the belief that offender profiling ‘works’ is an illusion deriving from the mixture of 
fact and fiction that has characterised offender profiling since its inception. They say that the anecdotal evidence 
in favour of offender profiling is given too much weight relative to the scientific-empirical support for offender 
profiling and that this has led to the premature acceptance of offender profiling as an investigative technique. 
 
The state of affairs that characterises offender profiling and investigative psychology is interesting to say the 
least. On the one hand, offender profiling has been applied in numerous real-world investigations and appears 
only to show signs of continuing the growth that the practice has experienced over the past two or three decades. 
On the other hand, the younger academic discipline of investigative psychology—its dedicated journal is only 
around ten years old—is struggling to establish its identity in the face of the possibility that the literature’s 
ultimate contribution may be to one day conclude that the whole idea of criminal profiling is an illusion deriving 
from the entertaining, exciting and compelling but, in the end, entirely fictional notions that have attended the 
development of offender profiling and investigative psychology since its beginnings. This whole enterprise, not 
least the academic investigative psychology part of it, is sustained not only by the pursuit of an answer to the 
question about the possibility of offender profiling and the multiplicity of secondary research questions that 
derive from this but by ‘pragmatism’.  
 
From its inception, investigative psychology has emerged and evolved in an environment where the market for 
profiling has been on the up and in which each new approach to inference imagined and tried successfully in 
practice or developed through academic inquiry has been added to a set of tools that have come to be valued by 
law enforcement professionals. This value may be ephemeral but so might be the value of many things. Whether 
successful profiles have really contributed substantively to critical breakthroughs in tough cases and whether 
this success, even if substantive, is due to luck, innate and unique skill on the part of the profiler, guesswork, 
experience or science is beside the point if real law enforcement professionals believe that the profile has been 
useful. Maybe, and this is potentially very significant, offender profiling keeps the investigative process moving 
when otherwise it would stall. Not surprisingly, in a context such as this both the practice of profiling and the 
academic field of investigative psychology have become characterised by a noticeable pragmatism that keeps 
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both sides developing new ideas rather than grinding to a shuddering halt pending further investigation. Alison 
et al. (2010) argue that this scientific pragmatism must be embraced. Indeed, one could argue that it has been 
embraced all along.  
 
II. Offender Profiling & the Organised-Disorganised Typology  
 
Offender profiling involves drawing inferences about the offender from evidence that is left at the crime scene. 
This is neatly summed up by Canter as A → C, where A is the ‘actions’ that occur in and are related to a crime 
and C is the ‘characteristics’ of the offender (Canter 2004, p.5). The drawing of inferences for C from A is 
encompassed within the symbol ‘→’. This is where all of the scientific modelling and processes underlying 
offender profiling sit (Canter 2004, p.5).  
 
Douglas et al. (1986, p.407) describe a five-stage process followed by the criminal profilers working out of the 
FBI’s Behavioural Science Unit: 
 
1. Profiling inputs stage. Here, information about the crime is gathered. This includes physical 
information about the crime scene, the environment, economic, social or political factors particular to 
the crime scene, information about the victim and forensics.  
2. Decision process models stage. This is the data analysis stage and may involve a complex information 
processing task. During this stage, the profiler is concerned with crime type and style, intent, victim 
risk, offender risk, escalation, time and location factors.   
3. Crime assessment stage. This involves the reconstruction of the crime and classification of the crime as 
organised or disorganised. Aspects of organisation that are considered include victim selection, control 
of victim and the sequence of the crime. Other factors that are considered during this stage involve 
motivation and crime scene dynamics.  
4. Criminal profile stage. This involves a description of the type of person who committed the crime and 
the individual’s ‘behavioural organisation’ with relation to the crime. This is then validated against the 
information pertaining to the crime (collected at the earlier stages).  
5. Investigation stage. Potential offenders are evaluated against the profile. The investigative process may 
end or further information may become available. The profile is re-examined and the investigative 
process continues until there is an apprehension.  
 
The organised-disorganised typology emerges in steps three and four. Behavioural and personality 
characteristics are associated with an organised or disorganised offender and these can be determined from the 
crime scene (Canter et al. 2004, p.293). For example, Canter et al. (2004, pp.293-294) suggest that an organised 
offender may lead an orderly life. He will have at least average intelligence, be socially competent and in skilled 
employment. This organisation will be reflected in a crime that is planned, where the victim is restrained and the 
weapon carried to and from the crime scene. The disorganised offender leads a disorderly life. This 
disorganisation will be reflected in the crime scene which will exhibit disarray, evidence left at the scene 
including, possibly, the murder weapon, the body left in the open and no use of restraints on the victim. It is 
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quite clear that within the profiling process as described, the organised-disorganised typology is the central 
‘inference generating’ model. If the examination of the relevant factors leads to a classification of the crime 
scene as organised or disorganised, then inferences can be drawn about the offender’s characteristics.  
 
Douglas et al. (1986) and Douglas & Olshaker (1996) include among these characteristics the type of 
automobile the offender is most likely to drive, the condition in which it has been maintained, its colour, 
whether the offender has a speech impediment or a law enforcement or military background, the offender’s age, 
employment, marital status, intelligence, education, personality, race, criminal record and even whether the 
offender might have passed a lie detector test during the investigation. As explained by Douglas et al. (1986) the 
process of classifying the crime and the offender as organised or disorganised may also shed light on 
motivation. For example, what appears to be a disorganised crime may have been staged deliberately to give 
exactly that impression or to hide the primary intent of the crime. Douglas et al. (1986) give the example of an 
investigation where the ‘staged’ intent of the crime was extortion or kidnapping for ransom. The real intent of 
the crime was sexually motivated rape and murder. The profilers were able to determine that the probable 
staging was an organised attempt by the offender to divert attention from the real nature of the crime. By 
inference, the offender could be expected to be drawing on knowledge of law enforcement procedures gained 
from some previous association with law enforcement. The profile of the unknown offender, which concluded 
that the individual may have been previously employed in law enforcement, was accurate in many respects.  
 
The problem is that much of the evidence about classification schemes or typologies is not very supportive of 
the idea that a robust typology is possible. Of course, practitioners would argue that this is not a critical flaw 
because such evidence overlooks the role of the instinctive ability of the profiler in piecing together the puzzle. 
But there are problems with this argument too. Some studies have compared the profiles constructed by 
professionals with profiles constructed by ordinary people and have found that no such innate ability exists. On 
a positive note, there does appear to be a semblance of structure in the crime scene and offender characteristics. 
There is not much to suggest something as neat as the organised-disorganised dichotomy but in a study of serial 
killings Canter et al. (2004) found that the murders were almost always characterised by a set of ‘organised’ 
characteristics (from the organised side of the disorganised-organised typology). These could prove to be 
interesting, particularly if all serial murderers exhibit similar ‘organised’ features but only particular 
‘disorganised’ features. There may be structure conducive to some typology embedded in the different ways in 
which serial killers exhibit disorganised aspects of their activities. 
 
The story of investigative psychology and offender profiling is unique because of its obvious pragmatism and 
the way in which fact and fiction interact so freely with the subject matter. Profiling is widely used and the 
organised-disorganised typology is the dominant typology despite a lack of empirical support within the 
academic investigative psychology literature. In empirical tests of the organised-disorganised typology, 
investigative psychologists have highlighted some of the hypotheses and assumptions that underlie the 
application of the typology within a profiling process. One of these is what Canter & Youngs (2009) call a 
‘consistency principle’. There are two ways in which this may be interpreted. First, the organised offender 
brings an organised approach to his criminal activity (Canter & Youngs 2009, p.336). His criminal behaviour is 
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consistent with his non-criminal behaviour. Second, the organised offender will continue to commit organised 
crimes over time (Snook et al. 2008). Organised offenders will not all-of-a-sudden start committing crimes that 
are disorganised. Both of these forms of consistency have been studied. An optimistic assessment from the point 
of view of proponents of the organised-disorganised typology would be that the evidence is mixed. Investigative 
psychologists tend to be more pessimistic about the results that have been obtained so far. Snook et al. (2008) 
argue that the whole idea of an organised-disorganised typology is flawed because it relies on personality traits, 
which have been discounted heavily as explanatory factors for behaviour within the broader psychology 
literature. Given the current state of affairs, we expect that an approach to profiling based on economic theory 
and the economic models of crime and criminal behaviour, which do not rely on personality traits, may be a 
useful complement to the existing approaches to offender profiling.  
 
III. Economics & Criminal Action 
 
Drawing inferences about the offender from the evidence left at the crime scene where an economic theory or 
model of criminal action enters under Canter’s ‘→’ is the next step for the economics of crime and its related 
fields of study12. One point of contention must be cleared up immediately, however. Economics is inextricably 
linked to a ‘rational choice’ model of behaviour the nature and implications of which are widely misunderstood 
both within and without economic science. Rational choice should only be interpreted to mean that a person 
chooses to allocate his scarce means—time, money and other resources—towards the achievement of some end 
or ends. It does not mean that the person will never make a mistake or somehow makes an infinite number of 
calculations that never err both in terms of input and output. It simply means that people act purposively. 
Anyway, the ‘non-expected utility’ models of choice developed within behavioural economics are just as useful 
to the offender profiling task as the orthodox expected utility models.  
 
It is probably true to say that Gary Becker is the most well-known ‘crime economist’. Of course, his reputation, 
among those familiar with his work, is built on his avant-garde applications of the orthodox expected utility 
model of economic behaviour to everything from crime to marriage. His work adopts the mathematical 
approach and casts all these sorts of behaviours in mathematical formulas. In his “Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach” Becker (1968) argues that economics can be used to develop optimal public and private 
policies to combat illicit behaviour. Obviously, this is broader subject matter than the development of an 
economic view of criminal action, which is to be found in his Section 3, ‘The Supply of Offenses.’ The supply 
of offenses is some function of the probability of apprehension, the punishment if convicted and a mixture of 
other variables such as income from legal activities, income from illegal activities, willingness to commit an 
illegal act and so on. Within this context, which really defines the opportunities for illegal and legal actions and 
the costs and benefits of each, the person will choose from among legal and illegal opportunities in a manner 
that maximises expected utility. Expected utility depends on the utility of the monetary and psychic income 
deriving from committing an offense and the disutility of costs of the punishment if the offender is caught. Each 
of these is weighted by the probability that the event (caught or not caught) will occur. 
 
                                                 
12 This includes defence economics with its study of terrorism and terrorist behaviour.  
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According to Becker (1968, p.176), this approach: 
 
“...follows the economists’ usual analysis of choice and assumes that a person commits an 
offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and 
other resources at other activities. Some persons become ‘criminals’, therefore, not because 
their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs 
differ. I cannot pause to discuss the many general implications of this approach, except to 
remark that criminal behaviour becomes part of a much more general theory and does not 
require ad hoc concepts of differential association, anomie, and the like, nor does it assume 
perfect knowledge, lightning-fast calculation, or any of the other caricatures of economic 
theory.”   
 
It is at the point where Becker ‘cannot pause’ that he references a work that is more important for our present 
subject matter and which more completely and painstakingly develops an economic view of criminal action. 
This is the work of Isaac Ehrlich. In 1967, his work was an unpublished manuscript. By 1973 part of this work 
and developments thereon had been published as “Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Investigation.”   
 
If economics can be summed up in two words they would be: opportunities and choices. By and large, economic 
analysis first determines the opportunities that are available and then examines the choices that a person will 
make when confronted by those opportunities. In Ehrlich’s (1973, p.522) work, this is very clear: 
 
“...Even if those who violate certain laws differ systematically in various respects from those 
who abide by the same laws, the former, like the latter, do respond to incentives. Rather than 
resort to hypotheses regarding unique personal characteristics and social conditions affecting 
respect for the law, penchant for violence, preference for risk, or in general preference for 
crime, one may separate the latter from measurable opportunities and see to what extent 
illegal behaviour can be explained by the effect of opportunities given preferences.” 
 
This passage also contains a clear statement of a key point of strength in the economist’s view of criminal 
action. This is the non-reliance on personality traits to explain criminal behaviour. This being said, it is still easy 
to fall into the trap of thinking that a criminal must be a risk-seeker and that economics has introduced a 
personality trait by sleight of hand. However, it is not necessarily true that a criminal is a risk-seeker. For one 
thing, risk-seeking would see the criminal engage only in the single most risky criminal activities rather than a 
range of criminal activities. More importantly, even if it is the case that criminals are on average more risk-
seeking (less risk-averse) than law abiding citizens, risk-seeking is not a personality trait that is particular to the 
criminal mind13. Rather, risk preference is something that is revealed by the choices that people make from the 
available opportunities. Given the adequate incentives structure, even risk-averse people may be willing to take 
more risks. Opportunities that have much higher risks attached may be selected if there is an appropriate chance 
of a much higher reward than that which is available from the ‘safer’ option. This is, of course, the essence of 
the large number of articles on incentives structures that can be found in the economics literature. In the end, 
criminals and non-criminals both respond to incentives.  
 
                                                 
13 The reason why economic analysis may conclude that a risk-seeker will spend more time in criminal activity than a risk-averter is because 
it is often assumed in the theory construction phase that legitimate activities provide a low risk or risk free return while criminal behaviour 
provides a risky return. If this assumption is not made, the risk-seeker may allocate time and resources to risky activities, all of which may 
be entirely legal. It would just depend on the opportunities (payoffs and risks) involved. 
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Ehrlich’s carefully developed treatment of the nature of the incentives embedded within the opportunities 
available to engage in legal and illegal behaviour allows him to examine criminal action in a more complete 
theoretical context where costs and gains from legal and illegal behaviour are considered, rather than just the 
cost of punishment. The other interesting feature of Ehrlich’s work is that it does not simply present the choice 
problem as one involving a choice of either a legal or an illegal activity as though these two things were 
mutually exclusive. Everyone has the option of doing legal and illegal things in some proportion. Many people 
who engage in criminal behaviour devote only some of their time to such illegitimate activities and spend the 
rest of their time doing legitimate things like holding steady employment. Over a life time, people may also drift 
in and out of criminal behaviour. The choice is an allocation of time and other resources to the available 
opportunities and the choices that are made need not be exclusively illegal or legal. 
 
Ehrlich works in the neo-classical style of mathematically expressing the opportunity set and the (expected) 
utility that the person attaches to each choice. As such, a person has an expected utility function that is applied 
to the available opportunities which, in this case, consist of a set of legal and illegal activities each with a benefit 
and a cost. Ehrlich assumes that legitimate activities are safe because the returns that can be had from them are 
known with certainty. Illegitimate activities are risky because the returns that can be had from them are 
uncertain and depend upon whether or not the person gets caught and what punishment is imposed in the event 
of capture. The activities are not mutually exclusive and the person’s choice problem is not to simply choose the 
activity (legal or illegal) that has the highest expected utility but to choose the legal activity, the illegal activity 
or a combination of both that has the highest expected utility. Since the decision-maker cannot carry on this 
‘market’ activity without pause, he or she must also spend some time involved in neither legal nor illegal 
activity. Ehrlich calls this ‘consumption’ or ‘non-market’ activity. As mentioned before, many mistakes may be 
made in this choice process and it is not the case that the person is assumed to choose perfectly and accurately.  
 
Once set down mathematically, the choice problem can be solved. This usually means that first order optimality 
conditions are determined and the equilibrium choices obtained. What can be said about the choices in 
equilibrium depends on the context that has been sketched or delineated. Within Ehrlich’s analysis, the person is 
choosing to allocate time and resources to legal and illegal activities and ‘consumption’ activities such that 
expected utility is maximised. Ehrlich is able to work out the optimal values for each of these times spent under 
different conditions, especially when the person making the choice has different types of risk preference, and 
determine a range of different possible combinations of illegal and legal activities. For example, whatever a 
person’s risk preference may be, a sufficient condition for entry into illegal activity is, roughly, that the marginal 
expected return on illegal activity exceeds the marginal return on legal activity. If the person is risk-averse, this 
is also a necessary condition. If this condition is not met, risk-averters will never engage in illegal activity and 
will allocate all time and resources to legitimate activities (Ehrlich 1973, p.528). Ehrlich also determines under 
which conditions a risk-seeker will specialise completely in illegitimate activity and when a risk-averter can be 
expected to combine legal and illegal activities.  
 
This theoretical framework can form the basis for an empirical analysis once estimates for the relevant variables, 
such as the probability of apprehension and the payoffs generated by legitimate and illegitimate activity, are 
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determined. Various predictions flow from the framework and these predictions can be tested empirically. For 
example, Ehrlich finds that it is optimal for some offenders to repeatedly offend and even increase the intensity 
of their illegitimate activity. Changes in the probability of apprehension or the cost of conviction will change the 
incentive structure. If these things increase and everything else remains the same, incentives for illegitimate 
activity are reduced. However, the response of the prospective criminal to this change in the structure of the 
available opportunities depends on his or her risk preference. A one percent increase in the expected marginal 
costs of punishment will have a more than proportional effect on the decisions of the risk-averter but a less than 
proportional effect for a risk-seeker. In fact, Ehrlich (1973 p.530) shows that a risk-seeker who allocates some 
time to legal activities and some time to illegal activities may actually be inclined to increase his or her 
allocation to illegal activities when the expected marginal cost of punishment increases. Similar results can also 
be worked out for situations where there is an increase in the expected marginal return to illegal activity.  
 
Opportunities and incentives matter in explaining how a person allocates time between legal and illegal activity. 
The best choices that a person can make when confronted by these opportunities can be worked out and the 
ways in which the best choices change when opportunities are reshaped can be determined. An economic 
perspective on criminal action along the lines developed by Ehrlich and the other economists that have followed 
in his and Becker’s footsteps can tell us what to expect with regards to the conditions under which people will 
engage in criminal activity, the ways in which they divide their time between legal and illegal activity, the 
relevance of risk preference and the effect of changes in law enforcement strategies and penalties. Useful as this 
might be, we have come to the point where we must turn this theoretical work on its head. Once we observe an 
offense such as a murder or a robbery or assault or an act of terrorism, what can the economic view of criminal 
action say about the offender? If we observe a particular crime, what can economics say about the person who 
committed the crime? The essence of these questions is an economic approach to offender profiling where the 
framework that permits evidence left at the crime scene to be used to draw inferences about the offender is one 
that is some offshoot of the economic view of criminal action.  
 
IV. Drawing Inferences about a Thief or a Murderer or a Terrorist with the Help of Economics 
 
Crime has many dimensions and there are many types of crime. If it is possible to classify crimes and criminals 
according to some classification scheme or typology, if profiling is actually possible, then there could be lots of 
typologies that ‘work’ across a particular scope or range of criminal activity. Some of these may be drawn from 
psychology and some may be drawn from other fields of study. To me, if economics has an ‘in-built’ typology 
that is ready to use for offender profiling it is the one that emerges from the risk preferences of people making 
choices under risk and uncertainty. We have elsewhere tried to elaborate on this point with reference to lone 
wolf terrorism (Phillips & Pohl 2012) and if you read Ehrlich (1973) you will see how important risk preference 
is in shaping the choice to allocate time between legal and illegal activities. What Ehrlich does not do and what 
represents an exciting next step for the economics of criminal action is to ask what the crime itself says about 
the risk preference of the person who committed it and work from that point backwards through the theory to 
come up with a list of inferences about the criminal.  
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Risk is something that the investigative psychologists have not fully worked out. They certainly have no 
measure for it. Economists on the other hand do have a measure of risk and that is the variability or standard 
deviation of the outcomes to legal and illegal activities. If you like, you can assume that the returns to legal 
activities have no variability. This is probably true if the time frame selected for the analysis is short. But 
illegitimate activities have uncertain payoffs, returns or outcomes and so what actually results from a venture 
into illegitimate activity may be different from that which was expected. This is the risk. A criminal might get a 
higher or lower payoff than expected. What can be expected is the average of what has happened in the past. If 
one thinks for a moment about how many facets of risk the dispersion measure encompasses it becomes clear 
that it encompasses all of the things that lead to higher or lower payoffs. This could be detection by the police, 
having a bombing device malfunction, being informed on by a co-conspirator, being confronted with better or 
worse security, being able or unable to sell the stolen goods at the expected price, being able or unable to 
accumulate as many victims as expected or receiving more or less media attention than expected14.  
 
The theory of risk preference divides people up into risk-averse and risk-seeking. However, it would be more 
accurate to say that people are more risk-averse or less risk-averse. The technical meaning of ‘risk-seeking’ 
implies that a person gives up expected payoffs to take on more risk and, furthermore, allocates all resources to 
the riskiest possible activity. In the case of criminal activity this would mean, strictly speaking, that the risk-
seeker would not only allocate all of his time and resources to illegal activities—remember that legal activities 
are assumed to be safe—but he would allocate all of his time and resources to the riskiest possible illegal 
activity. Although some people probably are risk-seekers, the conclusion that some people are less risk-averse 
while others are more risk-averse agrees more with what we observe day-to-day. Less risk-averse people may 
engage in illegitimate activities to some extent but these need not be the riskiest available opportunities. Hence, 
we have a range of criminal behaviour from petty and less risky crimes to serious and very risky crimes. When 
we observe criminal action it is not always of an extremely serious nature and it is not always the most risky 
thing that a person could have chosen to do15. The technical definition of risk-seeking behaviour and what it 
means for a person to be a genuine risk-seeker tends to be overlooked too often, especially by economists.  
 
Risk is higher when there is a greater dispersion or range of possible outcomes. It might be possible to extract 
some measure of dispersion to associate with various crimes, choices of weapons, locations and so on. By 
thinking about the objectives and choices of terrorists in a way that is different from which they were usually 
portrayed in the literature I have shown how risk might be measured from the terrorists’ point of view (Phillips 
2009). That is, for the terrorist who aims to inflict fatalities, the variability of expected fatalities for a given 
attack method reflects the likelihood that the actual number of inflicted fatalities will be different from what the 
terrorist expected. The same idea can be applied to other types of crimes. However, even if a quantitative 
measurement cannot be obtained, the economic definition of risk as variability may still be very useful in 
classifying and analysing criminal activity and particularly useful in defining another aspect of offender 
behaviour. An offender who is more averse to a broader dispersion of possible outcomes will take ‘variance 
minimisation’ actions. An offender who is enticed by a broader dispersion of possible outcomes will not take 
                                                 
14 See Pohl, G. 2015. Media and Terrorist Choice: A Risk Reward Analysis. Journal of Applied Security Research, 10, 60-76. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2015.972271  
15 That is, it is not always the action with the largest possible dispersion or variability of potential outcomes.  
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such action and may possibly take ‘variance enhancement’ actions. We should be able to identify such actions 
from the evidence left at the crime scene or from the nature of a terrorist attack. This should allow us to classify 
offenders as more or less risk-averse based on their ‘revealed risk preference’.  
 
The process of drawing inferences about the offender from evidence left at the crime scene may begin by 
determining the riskiness of the crime and identifying variance minimisation or variance enhancement actions 
taken by the offender. Once inferences about the risk preference of the offender have been drawn, it should be 
possible to draw further inferences about the offender which include but are not limited to the amount of time (if 
any) he might spend in other activities besides illegal ones, his location relative to the crime scene, his likely 
response to law enforcement attention and his propensity to increase, decrease or cease his involvement in 
criminal activity. These are not insignificant potential contributions to the investigative process. Inferences 
along these lines are possible because the offender is continuously interacting with his available opportunities 
and incentives. This interaction is shaped by risk preference. Working through the implications of this 
interaction should shed some light on the characteristics that describe the unknown offender in any context 
where opportunities and choices can be delineated. 
 
IV (a). Risk Preference and Time 
 
An offender who is more risk-averse is more likely to hold steady employment or allocate a larger proportion of 
his time and resources to legitimate activities. He is less likely to specialise completely in illegitimate activity. 
Variance from the expected outcome is our measure of risk. An offender who is more risk-averse will be 
involved in crimes where this variance is relatively low and he will be seen to take steps to lower it. Richard 
Cottingham16 is a convicted serial murderer serving a life sentence for six murders. The murders were 
committed between 1967, when Cottingham was just twenty-one years old, and 1980 when he was arrested 
while leaving a hotel where he had been assaulting a victim. All but one of his victims were prostitutes, which 
he would first make contact with on a city street or in a bar. The victims were drugged and taken to hotel rooms 
where they were killed. The more risk-averse offender will require vulnerability and accessibility among his 
potential victims. Cottingham focussed his attention on just such a type of victim. He further minimised the 
possibility of an outcome that differed from his expectations by drugging his victims. Once the victim had been 
drugged, he had effectively eliminated one of the main sources of variance from the outcome he desired or 
expected.  
 
The drugging of victims and the almost exclusive focus on vulnerable and accessible victims must certainly be 
interpreted as being indicative of behaviour that is more risk-averse. Such a type of person is less likely to 
allocate all of his resources and time to illegitimate activities and is more likely to be engaged for most of the 
time in legitimate employment and other pastimes. Variance minimisation in this case would lead the 
investigator to tentatively conclude that the offender was likely more risk-averse and likely to be engaged in 
some form of employment. Of course, further inferences then flow from this starting point. If the offender is 
expected to be employed somewhere then he must have the type of job that allows him enough time to find, 
                                                 
16 Details from Vronsky (2004) and Radford University’s Department of Psychology.  
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kidnap, assault and murder his victims. In order to remain engaged with his legitimate activities, the more risk-
averse offender will need to complete his illegitimate activities within a relatively short time frame and may 
have less opportunity to travel long distances or to stalk his victims. For the entire time, Cottingham was 
employed as a computer operator at Empire State Blue Cross-Blue Shield insurance where he worked the 3 pm 
to 11 pm shift (Vronsky 2004, p.13). He was also married with three children. He lived in New Jersey. He 
would find his victims in Manhattan before driving them to hotels in New Jersey. This is a distance of about 15 
miles. Depending on traffic, the distance could be travelled in about 30 minutes.   
 
IV (b). Risk Preference and Location and Geographic Dispersion of Criminal Activity 
 
If the offender is more risk-averse, he needs to find opportunities that present an appropriate risk-reward trade-
off. For the more risk-averse offender, this is likely to mean drifting farther afield geographically in order to find 
such opportunities. This is especially likely to be the case if his crimes have attracted the attention of 
investigators. If there has been police or media attention regarding his crimes at a particular location, he is more 
likely to drift farther afield and his crimes will be characterised by a growing geographical dispersion. Offsetting 
this tendency to some degree will be the fact that the offender feels more comfortable within a particular 
location and, as discussed, the possibility that he is constrained in scope by the nature of his other activity 
(family or employment). It is likely that this tendency will continue to exert influence over his behaviour, 
keeping him close to home for longer than expected and leading him back there after some time has lapsed. In 
this regard, the risk seeking offender’s expected behaviour is less uncertain. His opportunities for an appropriate 
risk-reward trade-off are enhanced by police and media attention and he will be enticed by the prospect of being 
so close to the focus of the investigation.  
 
If geographic dispersion of criminal activity is a variance reduction strategy, the dispersion of criminal activity 
must reveal something about the offender’s risk preference. Similarly, if we have already reached some 
conclusion about the offender’s risk preference we may be able to make further inferences about the 
geographical location of his past and future crimes and his proximity to them. It should be noted that police and 
media attention are likely to be an important factor operating on this choice because such attention either repels 
or entices the offender and may also upset the distribution of his opportunities as potential victims take 
additional precautions. Ted Bundy murdered 36 known victims17. The characteristics of both his early and later 
crimes have several distinct variance minimisation features. Victims would be attacked while sleeping in their 
own homes or taken in carefully planned abductions from public places, including college campuses. Usually 
they would be bludgeoned and restrained before being transported to another location. In both types of attack, 
Bundy acts to minimise the chances that the victim will struggle, escape or call for help. Little evidence linking 
Bundy to his crimes was ever found at the scene, highlighting the careful risk management strategies that he 
used. Bundy’s crimes took place over a very wide geographic area from Florida to California. At various times, 
police attention apparently placed enough pressure on him to cease his activity and move to a different location.  
 
                                                 
17 Details from Radford University’s Department of Psychology. 
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The level of risk—the chances that the actual outcome will be different from that which was planned and 
expected—that the offender perceives is an important factor in shaping the behaviour of the offender and the 
geographic dispersion of his crimes. Although the offender who is more risk-averse is more likely to scatter his 
activities over a larger area, some offenders will manage to attract so little attention that this tendency is offset 
by these other variance minimisation strategies. It should be expected, therefore, that some offenders will 
display obvious variance minimisation strategies, such as drugging their victims, whilst simultaneously 
operating over a small geographic area in close proximity to their primary place of residence. Although this may 
appear to be inconsistent, some serial killers have so minimised the amount of attention directed towards their 
crimes that they have been able to operate within a very small area for considerable periods of time. Jeffrey 
Dahmer murdered 16 people in his own place of residence but disposed of the bodies (or kept them) such that 
minimal attention was drawn to the possibility that an active serial killer was operating in the area18. Dahmer 
usually drugged his victims before they were murdered. He worked various jobs, including at a chocolate 
factory. He was discovered only when a potential victim escaped.  
 
IV (c). Risk Preference and the Response of the Offender to Police and Media Attention 
 
A less risk-averse offender may be expected to be somewhat thrilled by law enforcement attention. If it is not 
forthcoming, he may invite it by taunting the police through letters or some other form of communication. 
Similarly, taunts may be evidence of risk-seeking behaviour and may further reinforce any conclusions already 
reached about the offender. A more risk-averse offender, on the other hand, is less likely to resort to taunting 
law enforcement. He might, however, be expected to engage in behaviour designed to divert law enforcement 
attention away from himself and away from the true nature of his crimes. This type of behaviour is described by 
Douglas et al. (1986) and may include staging in order to distract from the real intent of the crime. As such, if 
the offender has been classified as risk-averse, law enforcement may find that as the investigation closes in, the 
risk-averse offender goes so far as to come forward with information designed to distract the progress of the 
investigation. Viewing the offender as a decision-maker confronting and managing a risk-reward trade-off may 
lead to numerous interesting insights about the offender’s possible behaviour.  
 
The offender who is less risk-averse does not need to drift in order to find opportunities that have an appropriate 
risk-reward trade-off. In fact, his opportunities for an appropriate risk-reward trade-off grow as attention is 
directed towards him and his crimes. Sometimes, the offender may believe that this attention is not being 
directed forcefully enough and that the level of risk, the possibility that the actual outcome will be different from 
that which was expected, is not high enough. This will bring the offender forth in a series of taunts to police or 
the media. David Berkowitz murdered 6 people and wounded 9 in a series of shootings in New York City in the 
late 1970s19. His use of a firearm and the stalking and shooting of his victims on the street or in parked cars 
within a fairly narrow geography is indicative of behaviour that is less risk-averse. The actual outcome of 
attacks involving firearms must have a higher possibility of diverging from the expected outcome than a 
situation in which the victim is drugged or otherwise overcome. When the attacks take place in public places, 
there is also a much higher chance of witnesses, intervention by passers-by and so on. In at least several 
                                                 
18 Details from Radford University’s Department of Psychology. 
19 Details from Radford University’s Department of Psychology. 
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respects, Berkowitz’s behaviour exhibited fewer signs of risk aversion than the other cases that we have 
mentioned. He taunted police and others in a series of letters.  
 
IV (d). Risk Preference and the Intensity and Frequency of Criminal Behaviour 
 
Risk preference is not solely an ‘absolute’ phenomenon. As the series of crimes progresses and monetary 
payoffs or victims or press speculation mounts, the behaviour of the offender comes to be shaped by his relative 
risk aversion. Relative risk aversion describes the amount of time and other resources that are allocated to a 
risky activity as payoffs accumulate or the proportion of overall activity characterised by more or less variable 
outcomes20. There are three types of relative risk aversion: (1) increasing; (2) constant; and (3) decreasing. If the 
offender has increasing risk aversion, he will allocate fewer resources and less time to risky criminal activities 
as his payoffs accumulate. If the offender has decreasing risk aversion, he will allocate more resources and more 
time to risky criminal activities as his payoffs accumulate. Both increasing and decreasing relative risk aversion 
make sense in different scenarios and neither is recommended over the other, though economists have usually 
used utility functions that are characterised by either decreasing or constant relative risk aversion. That being 
said, utility functions characterised by increasing relative risk aversion, such as the quadratic utility function, 
can be found to approximate or resemble utility functions characterised by decreasing relative risk aversion 
(Elton et al. 2003, p.220).  
 
Relative risk aversion is an important concept that may find useful application in the field of offender profiling. 
One of disadvantages of the organised-disorganised typology is its implicit reliance on a ‘consistency’ principle. 
Disorganised (or organised) offenders are always disorganised (or organised) in their non-criminal activities. 
Disorganised (organised) offenders always commit disorganised (organised) crimes over time. A disorganised 
offender does not become organised. The economic concept of relative risk aversion is much more subtle and 
allows for changes in the frequency and intensity of the offender’s crimes as payoffs accumulate. If the offender 
is characterised by increasing relative risk aversion, the resources that he allocates to his risky criminal 
behaviour will decrease as his payoffs accumulate. In this case, the risk-averse offender may be expected to 
curtail his activities after some amount of payoffs accumulates or after a particularly intense period during 
which many payoffs are obtained. The opposite reasoning applies for offenders who may be characterised by 
decreasing relative risk aversion.  
 
Many of the serial killers whose profiles and cases have been detailed by the Department of Psychology at 
Radford University display a tendency to increase or decrease the intensity and frequency of their criminal 
activities at various points in time. A number of them abruptly ceased their involvement in serial killing at some 
point. A prominent example is Dennis Rader (B.T.K.). Rader killed his first victims in January 197421. Rader 
would probably be classified as being less risk-averse. He knew some of his victims and had worked with some 
of them. He would force entry into the victims’ homes and wait for them to arrive. He would usually leave his 
victims at the murder scene. He did not drug or bludgeon the victims in surprise attacks. After confronting his 
                                                 
20 For example, if a terrorist group is characterised by decreasing relative risk aversion, then as its inflicted fatalities increase its use of attack 
methods with more variable outcomes may increase as a proportion of its overall attack method portfolio.  
21 Details from Radford University’s Department of Psychology. 
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victims in their home he would bind and gag them. His attacks involved multiple victims at a single location, in 
one case a whole family. He taunted police, the media and potential victims with letters on a number of 
occasions. He lived in close proximity to the attacks. After claiming 10 victims, Rader apparently ceased his 
activities in 1991. He re-emerged in 2004 with a series of letters to police and the media. These actions 
ultimately led to his arrest.  
 
After a series of killings between 1974 and 1977, Rader ceased his attacks and does not appear to have engaged 
in any killings until 1985. At this point, there was a series of attacks between 1985 and 1987 before a further 
cessation and one final attack in 1991. Rather than concentrating solely on the nature of the crime scenes in an 
attempt to discern patterns linking the crimes to a single offender and to identify organised or disorganised 
features of the crimes that may allow the offender to be classified, the concept of relative risk aversion will lead 
the investigator to consider the intensity and frequency of offenses in relation to the number of victims that the 
offender has claimed in the past. An offender who is characterised by increasing relative risk aversion will 
allocate less time and resources to his criminal activities as his victims accumulate. There could even be a point 
of satiation that leads to the suspension of criminal activity for an indefinite period of time. Such behaviour is 
associated with particular classes of utility functions and further inferences about the offender may be drawn if 
the investigator is able to narrow down the type of utility function that mirrors most closely the offender’s 
decision-making process.  
 
IV (e). Prospect Theory and a ‘Copycat’ Point of Reference 
 
Another way in which economics may contribute to the provision of behavioural investigative advice is through 
the application of non-expected utility models of behavioural economics, especially the ‘prospect theory’ of 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979; 1992). The idea that people reference their behaviour against some reference point 
is an important one. If a terrorist knows that another terrorist just got paid a ransom of two million dollars for his 
hostages, the terrorist will perceive a ransom of one million dollars to be a ‘loss’22. Prospect theory may have a 
particularly valuable application in the analysis of ‘copycat’ acts of criminal behaviour. If it is ascertained or is 
otherwise revealed that the offender is obsessed with emulating the actions of a predecessor murderer, serial 
killer or terrorist then the results of the predecessor’s actions, his number of victims, may become the reference 
point by which the unidentified suspect is making his assessment of potential gains and losses from his own 
planned actions. Under such circumstances, particular opportunities become more attractive than others and this 
ordering of preferences may be different when looked at from a prospect theory perspective than from an 
expected utility perspective.  
 
Imagine for example a prospective terrorist who is obsessed with the actions of Theodore Kaczynski. Like 
Kaczynski and every other terrorist, the prospective terrorist can choose from a variety of different attack 
methods each with a particular expected number of victims per attack and each with a possibility (risk) that the 
actual number of victims will be higher or lower. Kaczynski was responsible for inflicting 26 injuries and 
fatalities. For the prospective terrorist who references himself to Kaczynski, this number of injuries and fatalities 
                                                 
22 The terrorist or terrorist group might be interested in media attention. The analysis would apply equally well in a situation where media 
attention is the desired payoff (Pohl 2015).  
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becomes the reference point from which he assesses the value of his planned actions. In choosing an attack 
method from his set of attack method opportunities within a prospect theory context, the assessment of the value 
(utility) of each opportunity is not made against some final state of affairs but against gains and losses from the 
reference point. Designed to correct some perceived shortcomings with expected utility theory, prospect theory 
could prove to be of value to investigative processes in cases where a suspect is thought to be making his 
decisions based on some point of reference. In such cases it should be possible to figure approximately the 
chances of the prospective terrorist taking particular opportunities rather than others. This would be of obvious 
value to the investigative process and to law enforcement efforts designed to pre-empt and protect the public 
from an unknown offender’s potential actions23. 
 
IV (f). Identity as ‘Sense of Self’ and the Crime Scene 
 
Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) article on ‘Economics and Identity’ is one of those that tries to take a piece of 
psychology and embed it within orthodox economic theory. Identity has long been explored by psychologists 
and quite a lot has been written about identity and violent crime and terrorism24. Economists had tended to 
ignore the subject or treat it implicitly rather than explicitly in their models of choice but as Akerlof and Kranton 
have shown, the flexibility of the orthodox expected utility model is such that something that affects choice can 
be inserted into it relatively easily. If we put ‘identity’ into a utility function we are saying that the opportunities 
from which the person may choose are shaped by ‘identity considerations’ and that the person’s choice will 
depend on all the usual things that economists might consider relevant to the particular situation plus the 
person’s perceptions about gains and losses in utility that may be associated with those ‘identity considerations’. 
What is more, the choice may not simply be one that is affected by identity considerations. The choice that we 
might wish to analyse is the person’s choice of identity itself. This too may be looked at from the point of view 
of gains and losses in ‘utility’.   
 
Akerlof and Kranton only briefly touch on the implications of identity for criminal choice and the economic 
analysis of criminal action. What bears careful consideration is the possibility that a model of criminal action 
with ‘identity’ embedded within it may be made to yield inferences about an offender from evidence left at the 
crime scene and the nature of the crime. In this case, Canter’s A → C equation may be re-cast as A → I, where 
A is the ‘actions’ that occur in and are related to a crime and I is the ‘identity’ or ‘sense of self’ of the offender. 
The drawing of inferences for I from A is encompassed within the symbol ‘→’. Although there are many 
possibilities that might be explored in drawing inferences about the offender’s sense of self from evidence left at 
the crime scene, one of the most important could be the ways in which the offender responds to police and 
media attention and particularly to their rhetoric and symbolism. In the context of serial murder or terrorism, the 
rhetoric and symbolism used by the police and the media in relation to a particular crime or series of crimes may 
shape the offender’s actions through the interplay of rhetoric, symbolism and ‘identity considerations’. Law 
enforcement professionals are aware that managing the media and publicity associated with a crime or series of 
                                                 
23 For more on prospect theory and the investigative process, including its application to geographic profiling, see Phillips & Pohl (2014; 
2015) and Phillips (2014; 2016). 
24 See Victoroff (2005). We discussed identity in the terrorism context at some length in one of our very early articles (Phillips & Pohl 
2011).  
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crimes is important. An identity model such as that developed by Akerlof and Kranton may allow for further 
enhancements in this management process. For example, the rhetoric and symbolism used within the media in 
relation to a particular offender’s actions may reinforce or create a sense of self that perpetuates his criminal 
action.  
 
Within an economic model that does not contain ‘identity considerations’ it is possible to say that the offender 
who is less risk-averse may experience positive increments in utility from police and media attention. He may 
even seek to enhance this attention by taunting law enforcement and the media. Adding identity to the analysis 
of such behaviour allows us to consider the choices of the offender within a context where his actions and the 
actions of others play some role in shaping his sense of self and his sense of self in turn plays a role in 
determining the utility he obtains from particular choices. For a person whose utility is described by the utility 
function presented by Akerlof and Kranton (p.719), the actions of others clearly play a role in shaping the 
person’s identity. Identity in turn shapes his choices by affecting his valuation of the various opportunities 
available to him. Considering the identity-related payoffs to the offender’s actions may allow something to be 
said about his sense of self. A weak sense of self may be revealed in his criminal actions and his 
communications with police and the media. A person’s weak sense of self may be reflected in both his criminal 
action and in his legitimate action, such as occupation choice. A person with a weak sense of identity as a ‘man’ 
may choose an occupation more strongly associated with the social category ‘man’ (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 
p.732). A person with a weak sense of self may try harder to establish his identity or to perpetuate or to overturn 
an identity portrayed of him.   
 
Much more recently, we have returned to the subject of identity25. Again, in the context of terrorism where most 
of our work is set, we recognise that terrorist groups seek to assert their identity through perpetrating particular 
actions. We use 𝑆𝑃/𝐴 theory, something which has not been done before, in order to examine a situation in 
which a terrorist group may be conflicted in its choice of alternative actions or attack methods. This allows us to 
identify the circumstances under which a terrorist group may be torn between its evaluation of potential gains 
and losses and its desire to assert the group’s identity in some particular way. This analysis, in which we 
interpret aspirations as assertions of identity, shows how attack methods may be favoured for their ‘security’ or 
‘potential’ by different types of decision-makers and explains how assertions of identity may conflict with 
strongly held emotions (fear, hope) which shape the evaluation the potential gains and losses of different courses 
of action. When aspirations lead a terrorist group to favour an attack method that does not align with its 
security-mindedness (fear) or potential-mindedness (hope), tension may emerge within the group that is difficult 
to resolve. Identity and the desire to assert it in a particular way may be at odds with the group’s evaluation of 
gains and losses of the available alternatives. Identity is not necessarily a unifying concept for a terrorist group.  
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
Investigative economics needs as much work as the investigative psychologists have dedicated to building their 
discipline. Years of work. Fortunately, both the theoretical frameworks of economics and the statistical methods 
                                                 
25 Phillips, P.J. & Pohl, G. 2016. Tension within Terrorist Groups: The Role of Aspirations in Conflicting Assessments of ‘Identity 
Defining’ Versus ‘Generic’ Actions. Working Paper. Available: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2853138  
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that are familiar to or have been pioneered by economists provide a strong foundation on which to build. What 
has been said here was intended to be, when I wrote the first draft several years ago, a primer for a future 
research program and I left the technical economics to one side as much as possible such that the potential 
contribution of economics to offender profiling may be understood by a wider audience. It will be important, as 
investigative economics builds, to retain the pragmatism that has characterised offender profiling and 
investigative psychology. The main reason for this is that, despite the results of some investigations, it is entirely 
possible that professional profilers do have a unique ability to construct inferences about an unknown offender. 
If this ability exists, built as it must be on a basis of the profiler’s personal characteristics, experience and 
training, then there is every chance that such ability bridges gaps in the scientific work that supports it. If ideas 
are discarded because they are not quite scientifically complete, the chance to see how well they work when 
used by professionals will be lost.  
 
Indeed, throughout my work I have stressed both the complementary nature of all of the different models and 
pieces of economic and decision theory that we have applied to illegitimate behaviour as well as the importance 
of law enforcement experience and intuition in bridging the gaps between theory and practice. In the terrorism 
context there is probably no such thing as a clear, unambiguous analytical result in the standard scientific sense. 
Studies have failed to find clear determinants of terrorism and no clear pattern of psychological or sociological 
attributes characterising terrorists. Economists and others involved in terrorism studies have, in the traditions 
handed down to them by twentieth century scientific methodology, directed their attention towards the 
identification of these ‘determinants’ and ‘patterns’ because the traditions they have inherited demand analytical 
closure at every step. This has induced a tendency to overlook the value of presenting consistent and logical but 
‘open’ analytical frameworks that are designed to be used and ‘closed’ by law enforcement practitioners. The 
results are not lists of determinants or fragments of patterns but the insights that are generated in practice.  
 
Here is an example of what I mean. Prospect theory is a formal model of decision-making under conditions of 
risk and uncertainty. We have shown how it can be used to determine preference orderings over alternative 
attack methods. This is our analytically ‘closed’ result, reported in our papers. Our ‘open’ result is potentially 
much more significant. Prospect theory, like each approach that we have taken, represents a different way of 
thinking about terrorist or criminal behaviour. This cannot be encompassed in a single reported result in the 
traditional sense. Rather, results emerge once the theory is connected to practice via the bridge of law 
enforcement experience and intuition. An investigative team, familiar with a particular type of offender and in 
the process of an investigation directed towards finding some unknown offender, will recognise an aspect of 
behaviour reflected in our analytical framework that would otherwise be overlooked. The analytical-theoretical 
framework and the investigative process must be connected via a bridge constituted of experience and intuition 
before the most important results can be obtained. Given the continuous evolution of contexts, these results will 
be dynamic in a way that cannot be captured by a set of results presented once and for all at a particular point in 
time26. Presenting the relevant pieces of theory in a coherent and visualisable framework is our ongoing task. 
We have managed, so far, to put a number of pieces in place. 
                                                 
26 For example, we show that terrorists will prefer particular attack methods over others. This will evolve as terrorist capability changes, new 
opportunities arise, old opportunities close and law enforcement adapts. The analytical frameworks must be used dynamically to realise their 
full value.  
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